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It has become fashionable in some eco-
nomic circles to suggest that the unemployment
rate in America is too low. Reductions routinely
trigger stock market declines and are accompa-
nied by baleful warnings that low levels of
unemployment are unsustainable. This line of
reasoning views low unemployment as the by-
product of an overheated American economic
engine whose long-run effects will inevitably
hurt the United States through both inflation
and a resurgence of unemployment.
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The U.S. unemployment rate fell to a
thirty-year low of 3.9 percent in April 2000—
more than two percentage points below the 6
percent that was widely regarded as unsustain-
able during the 1980s. Moreover, the unemploy-
ment rate has remained at supposedly unsus-
tainable levels for each of the past five years,
which suggests the remarkable unemployment
performance of the American economy cannot
be explained solely by short-term overheating.
Explanations given in previous work include
unusually strong productivity gains, increased
global competition, and more skillful business-
cycle management by government.
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This article discusses two other factors that
have contributed to the low rate of unemploy-
ment in America today: welfare reform and tech-
nological advancement. Yet these factors are not
without controversy. Welfare reform opponents
argue that welfare recipients face such formidable
problems in their everyday lives that they simply
cannot work, with or without a social safety net.
On the technology side, interest groups wary of
technological change envision a “digital divide”
that dooms low-skilled Americans to unemploy-
ment while high-skilled Americans prosper.
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It may well be the case that some welfare
recipients cannot work, especially those who
struggle with physical ailments or addictions to
alcohol or drugs. It may also be the case that the
ongoing technological revolution will provide
disproportionate benefits to those who are inti-
mately familiar with computers. But is there 
reason to believe at least some welfare recipi-
ents are finding work following the American
welfare reform law of 1996? Also, is there 
reason to believe low-skilled and disabled
workers are reaping benefits from technological
change along with high-skilled workers?
In this article, I examine these questions.
First, I present a job-search model that provides
a theoretical framework for analyzing the
impact welfare reform and technological change
have on unemployment. I discuss the empirical
evidence surrounding welfare reform and pre-
sent a model consistent with that evidence. I then




This article examines the
concept of unemployment
and, using a model derived
from the job-search literature,
explores how welfare 
reform and technological
change affect it. 
Jason L. Saving is an economist in the Research
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.27 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2000
analyze the controversial claim that welfare re-
form can cause unemployment, and I find that
seemingly minor changes in how unemploy-
ment is measured can produce dramatic differ-
ences in its level. Finally, I discuss the extent 
to which technological change is helping low-
skilled or disabled Americans, and I provide a
model consistent with that evidence.
The article draws three main conclusions.
First, welfare reform can reduce unemployment,
and the empirical evidence to date suggests the
recent American welfare reform effort has
caused hundreds of thousands of Americans to
leave the welfare rolls and enter the labor force.
Second, welfare reform can increase the official
unemployment rate by drawing new people into
the pool of job seekers, but it cannot increase the
number of people who are out of work. Finally,
technological change can help low-skilled or
disabled individuals become productive mem-
bers of the labor force, and there is reason to
believe it has done so during the 1990s.
A JOB-SEARCH MODEL
To better understand the relationship
between employment and public policy, it is
helpful to consider a model in which individu-
als receive a fixed number of job offers each
period and must decide whether to accept or
reject the best offer (Stokey and Lucas 1989).
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Suppose that an infinitely lived job seeker
receives, in each period, a best wage offer w
drawn from distribution f (w), which itself is
derived by receiving N offers from distribution
r.
5 The individual has two options: accepting the
offer (and ending the job search) or rejecting it
and receiving another offer the following
period. If the person accepts, lifetime utility is
(1) U(w) = Σβ tw = w/(1 – β ),
where β denotes the individual’s discount rate
and t is an index variable that measures time. If
the offer is rejected, the individual suffers a
(monetized) penalty, c, from the job-search
process and repeats the search process in the
next period.
6 In this case, lifetime utility is
(2) U(~w) = –c +  V(s)df (s) = –c + V 0,
where V(s) represents lifetime expected utility
and  s represents the individual’s next-period
best offer (which need not be accepted).
Under these assumptions, the individual will
choose to accept offer w when and only when
(3) w > (1 – β )(–c + V 0).
That is to say, there is a unique reservation
wage, w*, above which the individual will agree
to work but below which the individual will
continue to search for a job. Note that this reser-
vation wage is independent of the number of
previously rejected offers. An individual who
receives an offer after one hundred periods will
react identically to an individual who receives
the same offer after one period. If the offer is
high enough, it is accepted; if not, it is rejected.
Before turning to specific policy issues, it
is useful to examine how the reservation wage
changes as the cost associated with rejecting a
job offer changes. From Equation 3, the reser-
vation wage is a function of three things: a time
discount rate, the job-search cost, and the utility
an individual could expect to obtain by turning
down an initial job offer. Differentiating
Equation 3 with respect to c yields
(4) dw*/dc = (1 – β )(–1 + dV 0/dc).
From Equation 4, the direction in which
the reservation wage changes is based on the
discount rate and the change in turn-down util-
ity, dV 0/dc. By definition, 0 < β < 1. Moreover,
dV 0/dc must be less than zero because higher
search costs provide (other things equal) a
greater incentive for job seekers to accept the
best offer they are given in a current period
rather than forgoing that offer and paying addi-
tional search costs in the future. Therefore,
higher search costs unambiguously reduce an
individual’s reservation wage. In other words,
individuals whose search costs rise will settle for
a lower wage than they would have insisted
upon if their job-search costs were lower.
Suppose the world changes in such a way
that individuals are able to receive a greater
number of job offers in any given period.
Before this change occurs, an individual
receives N job offers from distribution r and has
to choose whether to accept or reject the high-
est offer. Assuming the additional job offers are
drawn from r, the expected best offer in any
period must rise because more offers are re-
ceived. More formally, the new best-offer func-
tion, fN, stochastically dominates the best-offer
function that existed previously.
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From Equation 2, the utility V 0 of reject-
ing any given wage is determined by an inte-
gration with respect to the function f. Since f is
stochastically dominated by fN, such an integral
must be larger with fN than with f, which implies
V 0 is unambiguously larger under fN. From
Equation 3, the reservation wage is also larger
under fN, so the individual will demand a higher
wage before accepting an offer if more offers
per period are received.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 28
This model permits an examination of the
employment-related aspects of welfare reform
and technological change.
WELFARE REFORM
The United States has had a government-
run social safety net for more than sixty years to
provide aid to needy citizens.
8 The system be-
gan in 1936, when President Franklin Roosevelt
responded to the Great Depression by imple-
menting the set of federal policies commonly
known as the New Deal. The federal social
safety net expanded during the 1960s Great
Society to the point that over one hundred 
welfare programs were available to the needy
(Dobelstein 1986).
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As the system became more generous and
more expansive, the number of families receiving
welfare benefits grew. Between 1966 and 1972,
welfare recipiency increased from 1.09 million
families to 3.05 million families. The figure then
rose as high as 5 million families in 1994, the
year in which the first draft of the welfare re-
form law was unveiled to the American public.
Believing the system discouraged work,
President Clinton signed legislation in 1996 that
dramatically reformed welfare. The law, known
as the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act, limits the number of
months individuals can receive checks. The law
also requires recipients (with some exceptions)
to perform some sort of work-related service,
though this service does not have to take the
form of a private-sector job.
Modeling Welfare Reform
Welfare programs are designed to make
unemployment more bearable. This has many
laudable effects, but it necessarily tilts the indi-
vidual decision-making calculus away from work
and toward welfare. In simplest terms, some
people will choose not to work if the choice
provides tangible benefits.
To capture the effects of a change in wel-
fare policy using the job-search framework pre-
sented above, suppose the government insti-
tutes a cash welfare benefit, b, that is paid only
to individuals who do not work. Lifetime utility
associated with accepting an offer in this case
remains
(5) U(w) =  β tw = w/(1 – β ),
but the lifetime utility associated with rejecting
an offer becomes
(6) U(~w) = b – c +  V(s)df(s) = b – c + V 0,
which is unambiguously higher than the quan-
tity in Equation 2. And under these assumptions,
the individual will accept an offer only when
(7) w > (1 – β )(b – c + V 0).
The wage at which an individual will work
is unambiguously higher in Equation 7 than in
Equation 3, which suggests two things. First,
welfare benefits cause individuals to spend
more time searching for a high-wage job than
they otherwise would because the costs of that
search are partially borne by the taxpayer. Second,
welfare benefits cause employment to be lower
than it would otherwise be because individuals
spend more time searching for work and less
time working.
By introducing time limits and work re-
quirements, the 1996 welfare reform legislation
in effect reduced the welfare benefit level. In
the model given here, welfare reform accom-
plishes the stated goal of its proponents: the
individual is more likely to accept work in any
given period, which reduces unemployment.
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The Evidence
The social science literature of the last
twenty years provides a moderate amount of
support for the hypothesis that welfare benefit
levels affect welfare recipiency. Previous work has
found links between generosity and recipiency
in a wide variety of government programs, in-
cluding Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) (Robins 1986), AFDC-Unemployed
Fathers Program (Hosek 1980), Medicaid (Blank
1989), and food stamps (Fraker and Moffitt 1988).
More recent work (Shroder 1995, Peterson and
Rom 1990) indicates this link may not be as
strong as had been previously thought. How-
ever, the relatively broad scope of the welfare
reform law and the relatively narrow year-to-
year changes with which most of these studies
are concerned suggest that previous work may
not be a good guide to the success or failure of
the current welfare reform effort. Instead, given
the relatively recent passage of the welfare re-
form law and the degree to which that law
changed the system, perhaps the best way to
determine whether it has affected welfare recip-
iency is to look beyond past studies and exam-
ine present empirical evidence.
The evidence to date indicates welfare
reform has significantly affected welfare recipi-
ency and that a large number of displaced wel-
fare recipients have responded by moving into
the labor market. Recipiency is down in every
state (Table 1), and the average decline in the
United States as a whole is over 40 percent. The29 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2000
Table 1
Number of Welfare Recipients Declines
August 1996 September 1999 Percent change
Alabama 100,662 46,086 –54
Alaska 35,544 22,546 –37
Arizona 169,442 88,485 –48
Arkansas 56,343 29,707 –47
California 2,581,948 1,668,173 –35
Colorado 95,788 32,507 –66
Connecticut 159,246 79,071 –50
Delaware 23,654 15,515 –34
District of Columbia 69,292  48,576 –30
Florida 533,801 174,588 –67
Georgia 330,302 140,558 –57
Guam 8,314 9,497 14
Hawaii 66,482 42,713 –36
Idaho 21,780 2,222 –90
Illinois 642,644 321,999 –50
Indiana 142,604 111,842 –22
Iowa 86,146 56,302 –35
Kansas 63,783 32,199 –50
Kentucky 172,193 92,415 –46
Louisiana 228,115 86,470 –62
Maine 53,873 33,474 –38
Maryland 194,127 76,504 –61
Massachusetts 226,030 121,586 –46
Michigan 502,354 234,262 –53
Minnesota 169,744 116,623 –31
Mississippi 123,828 33,911 –73
Missouri 222,820 124,519 –44
Montana 29,130 13,191 –55
Nebraska 38,592 29,378 –24
Nevada 34,261 17,032 –50
New Hampshire 22,937  14,677 –36
New Jersey 275,637  152,535 –45
New Mexico 99,661  76,300 –23
New York 1,143,962  763,648 –33
North Carolina 267,326  108,179 –60
North Dakota 13,146  8,064 –39
Ohio 549,312 247,798 –55
Oklahoma 96,201 39,200 –59
Oregon 78,419 43,204 –45
Pennsylvania 531,059 269,515 –49
Puerto Rico 151,023  99,022 –34
Rhode Island 56,560  47,942 –15
South Carolina 114,273  39,847 –65
South Dakota 15,896  6,932 –56
Tennessee 254,818 149,005 –42
Texas 649,018 287,296 –56
Utah 39,073 23,427 –40
Vermont 24,331 17,403 –28
Virgin Islands 4,898  3,387 –31
Virginia 152,845 86,279 –44
Washington 268,927 160,471 –40
West Virginia 89,039  32,238 –64
Wisconsin 148,888 23,892 –84
Wyoming 11,398 1,395 –88
U.S.Total 12,241,489 6,603,607 –46
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drops are most dramatic in states in which wel-
fare reform efforts have been greatest, with
declines of more than 80 percent in Wisconsin
(which pioneered welfare reform at the state
level) but less than half this amount in Hawaii
and the District of Columbia, which have done
little (beyond the requirements of the welfare
reform law) to change their welfare systems.
Moreover, a recent study by the General
Accounting Office (1999) finds that a majority 
of these individuals left welfare for work and
continue to work today.
In summary, there is strong empirical evi-
dence that welfare reform has encouraged
work. It should be noted that moving people
into the labor force is not the welfare system’s
only purpose. So the fact that welfare reform
has facilitated such movement does not address
the issue of whether welfare reform is desirable.
At a minimum, however, the evidence demon-
strates that welfare reform has affected the
behavior of welfare recipients.
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
One of the most important reasons welfare
reform was signed into law was its expected
effect on employment. Passage of the bill,
claimed proponents, would cause a substantial
rise in employment and ever-lower levels of
unemployment. In this section, I show that wel-
fare reform need not decrease the unemploy-
ment rate and may actually raise it. However,
welfare reform will increase the number of
workers because of its impact on labor force
participation.
To examine the effect of welfare reform
on unemployment, it is important to understand
the relationship between unemployment and
labor force participation. The federal government
defines the employment rate as the number of
workers divided by the number of people who
wish to work. The labor force participation rate,
in contrast, is the number of workers divided by
the size of the working-age population. While
conceptually similar, these definitions differ in
the way they treat people who are unemployed
and do not seek work either because they are
discouraged or because they prefer to receive
welfare benefits. These differences have impor-
tant implications for the unemployment rate.
As long as most people are either working
or searching for work, the employment and
labor force participation rates will not differ
substantially. When a significant number of 
people cease searching for work, however, the
difference can be considerable. For example,
suppose that every American but one decided
to permanently exit the labor force. The em-
ployment rate would be 100 percent if that one
individual had a job and zero percent if that one
individual did not. However, the labor force
participation rate would be negligible in either
case because no more than one person would
be working.
Figure 1 shows the U.S. unemployment rate
and the percentage of the population neither
working nor seeking work. As can be seen,
there is little correlation between these two
measures of joblessness. It is therefore impor-
tant to consider labor force participation.
Integrating labor force participation into
the job-search framework outlined above per-
mits a more comprehensive examination of 
welfare reform. For expositional simplicity and
to demonstrate the robustness of the result, I
make two assumptions that exaggerate the
effectiveness of welfare reform and then exam-
ine the period immediately after its implemen-
tation. First, consistent with a recent study that
suggests welfare benefits are considerably more
generous than is typically thought (Tanner,
Moore, and Hartman 1995), suppose no recipi-
ent in the prereform world searched for work.
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Second, consistent with the intent of welfare
reform, suppose every recipient in the post-
reform world searches for work. 
Even in this extreme example, welfare
reform cannot be expected to eliminate recipi-
ency because those who do not accept their
best-wage offer in any given period still receive
benefits. Calculating w* from Equation 7, a pro-
portion of former recipients, F(w *), will be
Figure 1
Percentage of Labor Force Unemployed 
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offered a wage less than w* and decline to
work, while 1 – F(w*) will be offered a wage
greater than w* and will accept a job. If the
number of prereform workers is Q, the number
of prereform recipients is R, and the number of
prereform nonrecipients seeking work is S, the
change in the labor force participation rate is
(8) ∆ L = (R)[1 – F (w*)] > 0,
the change in the number of employees is
(9) ∆ E = (R + S)[1 – F(w*)] > 0,
and the change in the unemployment rate is
(10) ∆ U = [(QS)F (w*) – (QR + R2 + RS)
(1 – F(w*))] ÷ [(Q + R)(Q + R + S)].
These equations reveal two interesting
aspects of welfare reform. First, Equations 8 and
9 show that reform necessarily increases the size
of the labor force and raises the number of
workers in the economy. Second, however,
Equation 10 demonstrates that the unemploy-
ment rate will not necessarily fall because the
increased number of workers is accompanied
by an increased number of people who seek
work but do not immediately find it.
From Equation 10, the extent to which the
unemployment rate rises or falls after welfare
reform is determined primarily by the extent to
which former welfare recipients’ work behavior
mirrors that of the population at large. If the
proportion of former welfare recipients who
find work is relatively high, welfare reform will
cause the unemployment rate to fall. If the pro-
portion is relatively low, welfare reform will cause
the unemployment rate to rise. In all cases,
however, welfare reform causes more people to
work—it is simply the standard unemployment-
rate definition whose sign is uncertain.
Given the popularity of the standard un-
employment rate as a measure of economic
health, can anything be said about whether, as
an empirical matter, welfare reform is likely to
raise or lower the unemployment rate? Accord-
ing to the best available data, approximately
two-thirds of those leaving the welfare rolls in
response to American welfare reform found jobs
and were still working a year later (General
Accounting Office 1999), which is almost equal
to the labor force participation rate of the popu-
lation as a whole. Moreover, the demographic
characteristics of former welfare recipients—
primarily single female heads of household—
would generally be associated with lower labor
force participation rates. While it is too early to
draw any firm conclusions, it seems reasonable
to infer that welfare reform has exerted a modest
downward effect on unemployment in the United
States.
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Technological advancement has been a de-
fining feature of the modern industrial economy.
While such advancement is often portrayed as a
process in which tech-savvy individuals prosper
while low-skilled people are left behind in a
“digital divide,” some innovations provide dis-
proportionate benefits to low-skilled people and
others help everyone. This section discusses the
effects of each of these types of technological
advances on workers.
Low-Skilled Workers
As the current economic expansion con-
tinues, a growing number of people previously
considered unemployable (such as those who
cannot add or cannot read) have entered the
U.S. labor force.
12 Technological advancements
have played a key role in helping people over-
come their disadvantages. Those who lack
strength or mobility can use machines to lift
objects or move from one location to another.
Those who lack dexterity can operate machines
that perform manual labor. Even people who
cannot read can perform tasks by touching pic-
tures on a computer screen rather than typing.
There are many other examples of how tech-
nology has helped reduce the need for physical
skills, and in each case, people who previously
lacked the requisite qualifications to work be-
came employable.
But why is anyone “unemployable” in a
market economy where employers base pay on
a worker’s contribution to company output? The
answer is found in the minimum wage. It is
often argued that the minimum wage raises
wages for everyone who works, and there is
evidence to suggest this is true for people who
can produce at a level equal to or greater than
the minimum wage. However, people who, for
whatever reason, find it difficult to produce at
that level will also find it difficult to find or
retain a job because hiring them at the mini-
mum wage may be unprofitable for an em-
ployer. In an age of heightened sensitivity
toward the less fortunate and the disabled, it is
especially important to examine this issue and
find ways these individuals can use their talents
to benefit both themselves and society.
Returning to the job-search model of the
previous section, suppose a subset of individuals
lacks the skills or abilities needed to perform
certain jobs.
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either by a reduction in the number of offers, N,
received in any given period relative to an ordi-
nary worker or by a shift in the offer distribu-
tion,  r, that reduces the average amount of
money offered relative to an ordinary worker. In
either case, the best-offer function, fD, for these
individuals is stochastically dominated by the
standard best-offer distribution, f. From Equa-
tion 3, the reservation wage for these individu-
als will be lower than that for ordinary workers.
Importantly, lower skilled and disabled indi-
viduals will suffer disproportionately from any
minimum wage wM—that is, they will have a
higher probability of unemployment in any
given period—because they are less likely to
receive an offer above it.
Now, suppose technological change in-
creases the proportion of jobs these individuals
can perform. This change boosts the number of
offers they receive in any given period, which in
turn shifts their best-offer function, fD, toward
the best-offer function, f, for other workers. As
a result, the probability that a low-skilled or dis-
abled person will receive a best offer, w, greater
than the minimum wage, wM, in any given
period rises. To the extent that this model cap-
tures the essential features of technological
advances, such advances can be expected to
increase labor force participation by low-skilled
and disabled individuals. In a very real sense—
as Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
and others have said—firms are now able to
“employ the unemployable.”
High-Skilled Workers
The job-search model can also be used to
examine ways in which technological change
can benefit high-skilled individuals. Despite
increasing attempts to make computer hardware
and software user-friendly, many technological
advances simply cannot be readily understood
or utilized by those with insufficient skills.
Suppose individuals differ only with
respect to a productivity attribute, pi, normally
distributed across the population. If firms adjust
their wage offerings based on the productivity
of potential hires, individuals with higher pro-
ductivity should have a relatively favorable
wage distribution from which to draw. To
model this in the job-search framework, let the
best-offer function be conditioned on worker
productivity, so that it becomes f (w;pi). Then
the reservation wage equation becomes
(11) wi > (1 – β )(–c + Vi
0).
By Equation 11, reservation wages will be an
increasing function of productivity.
Now, suppose a technological advance-
ment occurs that complements existing skills,
thus widening the disparity between the best-
offer distributions for low- and high-skilled
workers in much the same way that technolog-
ical change in the previous subsection lessened
the disparity. Because the minimum wage is not
binding for high-skilled workers, it is impossible
to say whether the combination of higher de-
mand from employers and higher salary de-
mands from high-skilled people would increase
or decrease the number of high-skilled workers.
However, it does have one important real-world
implication: the income distribution would be
increasingly unequal, which suggests that tech-
nological advancement can exacerbate as well
as mitigate the digital divide.
The extent to which technological ad-
vancement increases the disparity between rich
and poor has been a matter of considerable
debate in recent years. While a full treatment of
this issue is beyond the scope of this article, it
should be noted that many aspects of the
American economy increase income inequality
yet are regarded as socially desirable. For ex-
ample, recent gains in the number of college-
educated Americans have “worsened” the distri-
bution of income as the newly educated pull
farther away from those at the bottom of the
income ladder, yet no one is advocating that
people be discouraged from attending college.
Moreover, while conventional wisdom paints an
admittedly depressing picture of eternal have-
nots forgotten by the rest of society, low-income
individuals show a remarkable ability to better
themselves and move up the income distribu-
tion into the middle class and even the upper
class (Cox and Alm 1995).
Search Costs
In at least one respect, workers of all skill
levels have benefited from the computer revo-
lution: the technology-driven evolution of the
job-search process. Until the latter part of the
twentieth century, job hunting was often cumber-
some and time-consuming. Those in search of
work often traveled from city to city or spent
days in libraries poring over copies of major
newspapers. Finding work could take months
or even years.
With the Internet, however, the job-search
process has become much faster for workers
and companies alike. It has been estimated that
several million resumes are now online and
available to employers across the nation. And
with the Internet now available to about half the
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job listings from across the country in a matter
of seconds. Clearly, the job-search process has
been revolutionized by the technological ad-
vances of the 1990s.
As with the technological advancement
model given at the beginning of this section, the
Internet can be modeled as an expansion of the
number of job offers an individual can consider
in any given period. This expansion shifts the
best-offer function f in a direction beneficial to
the worker. Thus, every potential worker—not
just those on the favorable end of the so-called
digital divide and not just those whose skills or
abilities once rendered them unemployable—
can benefit from technological change.
CONCLUSION
Unemployment is one of the most closely
watched measures of economic health in America.
Strong opinions exist regarding both its desira-
bility and its inevitability, with high unemploy-
ment cursed for the misery it inflicts on the
unemployed but low unemployment feared as
an omen of an overheated economy.
This article examines the concept of un-
employment and, using a model derived from
the job-search literature, explores how welfare
reform and technological change affect it. The
article presents several findings. First, unem-
ployment is inevitable in a market economy, but
not everyone who is unemployed is so because
of historical inevitability. Second, welfare re-
form and technological advances can boost
employment, with a potentially disproportion-
ate impact on groups such as the low-skilled
and the disabled. Finally, when a large number
of individuals begin to look for work due to fac-
tors such as welfare reform, the unemployment
rate need not fall but the number of workers in
the economy will certainly rise.
In the real world, it can be difficult to
determine why people do not work. Even so,
changes to government policy or the broader
economy can mitigate unemployment. Laws
such as welfare reform can encourage people
previously outside the labor force to enter it.
Technological change can speed the job-search
process and make it possible for those with low
skills or disabilities to work as efficiently as
other workers. To the extent that current unem-
ployment figures are driven by the removal of
governmental and technological inhibitions on
work rather than by an overheated economy,
the remarkably low unemployment rate in
America today should be cause for celebration
rather than trepidation.
NOTES
1 See Kudlow (1998) and Herbert (1997) for commen-
tary on this issue.
2 See Koenig (1998) for a discussion of these and other
factors.
3 A recent study from the U.S. Department of Commerce
(1999) discusses the digital divide and some of its
implications.
4 Other work in the job-search literature includes
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (1994).
5 In this framework, the wage includes the monetized
values of all amenities or other job differences, so that
an individual always prefers a higher wage job to a
lower wage job.
6 See Saving (1998) for a discussion of factors that
affect this cost.
7 Stochastic dominance is discussed further in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Hadar and Russell
(1969).
8 Katz (1986) has an enlightening history of public and
private welfare provision in the United States. For a
more critical look at this history, see Olasky (1992).
9 Other forms of welfare, such as food stamps and
Medicaid, were in-kind programs whose eligibility
requirements were less strict.
10 The model given here does not consider the welfare
system’s effect on taxation. If a balanced-budget
assumption were made, reductions in welfare benefits
would also raise after-tax wages and thereby make
welfare reform considerably more effective than is the
case in the model given here. 
11 In the real world, a significant but unknown number of
recipients work but do not report their income to the
Internal Revenue Service.
12 Though disabled individuals received relatively little
attention in the past, at least one in eight members of
the U.S. population is officially categorized as disabled
(U.S. Census Bureau 1998).
13 Of course, many things commonly thought of as dis-
abilities have no impact on worker productivity. For the
purposes of this section, individuals with these types
of disabilities are not considered disabled.
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